Pregnant and Prejudiced: The Constitutionality of Sex- and Race-Selective Abortion Restrictions by Gillette, Justin
Washington Law Review 
Volume 88 
Number 2 Symposium: The Disclosure Crisis 
6-1-2013 
Pregnant and Prejudiced: The Constitutionality of Sex- and Race-
Selective Abortion Restrictions 
Justin Gillette 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Justin Gillette, Comment, Pregnant and Prejudiced: The Constitutionality of Sex- and Race-Selective 
Abortion Restrictions, 88 Wash. L. Rev. 645 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol88/iss2/11 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
15 - Gillette Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/11/2013 5:04 PM 
 
645 
PREGNANT AND PREJUDICED: THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEX- AND RACE-SELECTIVE 
ABORTION RESTRICTIONS 
Justin Gillette 
Abstract: Six states currently restrict a woman’s access to abortion based on her personal 
motivations for seeking the procedure. These laws, which prohibit abortions that are sought 
based on the fetus’s sex or race, raise challenging constitutional issues, as the restrictions do 
not fit neatly into the U.S. Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence framework. The 
constitutionality of these laws is also unclear because no legal challenge has been brought 
against them. This Comment argues that motive-based abortion restrictions are 
unconstitutional on several grounds. First, the laws violate the woman’s constitutional liberty 
rights, which protect the personal beliefs and motivations behind her decision to terminate a 
pregnancy. Second, the laws conflict with the Court’s holding that governments cannot 
prohibit abortions before the fetus has reached viability. Third, while the Court’s decision in 
Gonzales v. Carhart may support abortion restrictions motivated by moral concerns, the 
interests recognized in Gonzales are distinguishable from those furthered by motive-based 
restrictions. For these reasons, reviewing courts should strike down motive-based abortion 
restrictions as unconstitutional. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 1, 2011, Representative Trent Franks of Arizona 
introduced the Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass Prenatal 
Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA).1 The bill imposed criminal 
sanctions, including up to five years of jail time, on abortion providers 
who conduct the procedure when they know that the “abortion is sought 
based on the sex . . . or race of that child, or the race of a parent of that 
child.”2 In the House Judiciary Committee hearing, Representative 
Franks proclaimed that while the country had made great strides in 
protecting the civil rights of women and minorities, it had not yet 
adequately protected the civil rights of the unborn.3 He illustrated this 
                                                     
 Disclosure: The author served as an intern for the ACLU of Washington, a non-profit organization 
that does legal advocacy and lobbying in support of women’s reproductive rights. 
1. Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of 2011, H.R. 3541, 
112th Cong. (2011).  
2. Id. § 3. 
3. Hearing on H.R. 3451 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of Rep. Trent Franks). 
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point with dramatic statistics: 
[T]oday in America between 40 and 50 percent of all African 
American babies, virtually one in two, are killed before they are 
born, which is a greater cause of death for African Americans 
than heart disease, cancer, diabetes, AIDS, and violence 
combined. . . . Fourteen million Black babies have been aborted 
since Roe v. Wade. . . .  
Now, you add to that the thousands of little girls who have been 
aborted in America simply because they are little girls instead of 
little boys. And these are travesties that should assault the mind 
and conscience of every American.4 
PRENDA is part of a larger trend of legislation banning abortions based 
on the motives of women.5 Before the introduction of the federal bill, 
three states had already banned sex-selective abortions.6 In 2011, 
Arizona became the first state to ban both sex- and race-selective 
abortions.7 Many other state legislatures introduced similar legislation in 
2012.8 Some states have even considered banning selective abortions on 
grounds other than sex or race. In 2005, a state representative in Maine 
introduced a bill that would have prohibited abortions based on the 
sexual orientation of the fetus.9 The North Dakota legislature passed a 
law in 2013 banning abortions based on genetic abnormalities.10 
Proponents of PRENDA and similar motive-based restrictions claim 
that the laws are a response to a grave problem—the abortions of 
                                                     
4. Id. at 1–2. 
5. Joerg Dreweke, Sex-Selective Abortion Bans—A Disingenuous New Strategy to Limit Women’s 
Access to Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (May 30, 2012), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/nr/ 
2012/05/30/index.html (noting that “abortion rights opponents have advanced legislation during the 
last four years to ban sex selective abortion . . . in 13 states”). 
6. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/6(8) (2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-731.2.B (2012); 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 3204(c) (West 2012).  
7. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (2013). On March 30, 2011, Governor Jan Brewer signed 
HB-2443 into law. Arizona: Abortion Banned for Race Selection, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2011, at 
A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/us/31brfs-ABORTIONBANN_BRF.html.  
8. In the past three years, eight state legislatures have received bills proposing motive-based 
restrictions on abortions, with Oklahoma and Arizona passing these measures. Jaime Staples King, 
Not This Child: Constitutional Questions in Regulating Noninvasive Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis 
and Selective Abortion, 60 UCLA L. REV. 2, 27 n.130 (2012). The bills in Georgia, New Jersey, 
Massachusetts, Idaho, Minnesota, New York, and Rhode Island failed to pass. See id. at 27 n.131. 
9. Bill Would Ban Abortions of ‘Gay’ Fetuses, WND (Feb. 25, 2005, 8:45 PM), 
http://www.wnd.com/2005/02/ 29120/. Representative Brian Duprey claimed that the law was 
needed for when scientists discover a “gay gene.” Id. 
10. John Eligon & Erik Eckholm, New Laws Ban Most Abortions in North Dakota, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 27, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/us/north-dakota-governor-
signs-strict-abortion-limits.html?pagewanted=all. 
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thousands of African-American and female fetuses in the United 
States.11 Opponents of these measures argue that the claims of sex- and 
race-motivated abortions are unfounded and that the legislation is a 
dishonest attempt to chip away at women’s reproductive rights.12 
While the veracity of claims that certain fetuses are being specifically 
targeted for abortions is debatable, it is true that advances in 
reproductive technology have made it possible to identify more 
characteristics of a fetus at earlier stages of pregnancy.13 These 
technological developments are relevant to the parents’ decision whether 
or not to have a child, as they will have more relevant data on which to 
base their decision.14 Forms of noninvasive prenatal diagnosis, such as 
the analysis of fetal DNA found in the mother’s bloodstream, have the 
potential to reveal the sex of the fetus, along with other genetic traits, 
early in the first trimester.15 Preimplantation genetic diagnosis allows 
parents to screen embryos for certain conditions and traits, including sex, 
prior to in vitro fertilization.16 While some of these emerging 
                                                     
11. See Shaila Dewan, To Court Blacks, Foes of Abortion Make Racial Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
27, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/27/us/27race.html?pagewanted=all 
(describing pro-life organizations’ use of racial arguments against abortion); see also Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, It’s a Girl, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (Oct. 24, 2011), 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/10/4149 (arguing that sex-selective abortions are 
occurring in the United States). 
12. See NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM., SUSAN B. ANTHONY AND FREDERICK DOUGLAS NON-
DISCRIMINATION ACT (H.R. 3541): AN ATTACK ON THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS OF WOMEN OF 
COLOR 3 (2011), available at http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/download-files/hr3541-
testimony.pdf (“It is clear that this bill is a thinly veiled attempt to block access to abortion for 
communities of color under the guise of anti-discrimination policy.”); Susan A. Cohen, Abortion 
and Women of Color: The Bigger Picture, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Summer 2008, at 2, 3 
(arguing that higher abortion rates in communities of color are a product of inadequate access to 
contraception rather than a result of efforts by abortion providers to concentrate on minority 
communities); see also Hearing on H.R. 3451 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 21 (2011) (statement of Rep. John Conyers) (“What does the 
bill do? Oh, well, it makes it more difficult for women of color to obtain basic reproductive health-
care services that should be available to all women. . . . I think that this is a way of chipping away at 
Roe v. Wade.”). 
13. Jaime S. King, And Genetic Testing for All . . . The Coming Revolution in Non-invasive 
Prenatal Genetic Testing, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 599, 599 (2011).  
14. John A. Robertson, Abortion and Technology: Sonograms, Fetal Pain, Viability, and Early 
Prenatal Diagnosis, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 327, 370 (2011) (predicting that advances in technology 
will likely lead to a “great upsurge in the number of early abortions”); Elyse Whitney Grant, Note, 
Assessing the Constitutionality of Reproductive Technologies Regulation: A Bioethical Approach, 
61 HASTINGS L.J. 997, 1007 (2010). 
15. King, supra note 13, at 600; Heidi Anne Duerr, New Blood Test Reveals Fetus’s Gender Five 
Weeks After Conception, OBGYN.NET (Feb. 1, 2012), http://hcp.obgyn.net/pregnancy-and-
birth/content/article/ 1760982/2025382. 
16. Dr. Samuel Marcus, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD), IVF-INFERTILITY.COM, 
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technologies are costly and are not yet available to the majority of 
parents,17 other forms of prenatal analysis, such as genetic testing for 
Down syndrome or cystic fibrosis, are already common practices in the 
United States.18 
Recently, legislators have become increasingly concerned about 
women obtaining abortions for reasons related to specific fetal traits, 
which has resulted in  the introduction of state and federal legislation to 
curb such practices.19 These motive-based restrictions raise challenging 
constitutional issues, as the laws do not fit neatly within the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence framework. Currently, the State 
can fully restrict women’s access to abortion once the fetus has attained 
viability, as long as there is an exception for the mother’s health.20 
Before a fetus has reached viability, the State can only create 
mechanisms to influence and inform the woman’s decisionmaking, but 
cannot pass measures that constitute an “undue burden” on the woman’s 
ability to obtain an abortion.21 The Supreme Court has arrived at these 
standards by weighing a variety of distinct interests: the State’s respect 
for fetal life;22 the State interest in women’s mental and physical 
health;23 and the woman’s interest in her own reproductive autonomy.24 
Through weighing these competing interests, the Supreme Court has 
upheld several types of abortion restrictions, including restrictions on 
when an abortion can be performed,25 what kinds of medical procedures 
                                                     
http://www.ivf-infertility.com/ivf/pgd.php (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).  
17. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 14, at 372 (noting that “[preimplantation genetic diagnosis] is 
not cheap or easy and will not appeal to most people”). 
18. Sonia Mateu Suter, The Routinization of Prenatal Testing, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 270 
(2002). These tests are also the subject of political debate and controversy. See, e.g., Tom Cohen, 
Santorum Challenges Policy on Prenatal Testing, CNN (Feb. 20, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/19/politics/santorum-prenatal-testing/index.html. 
19. See, e.g., Joanna Hlavacek, Kansas Senate OKs Bill Prohibiting Sex-Selection Abortions, 
KAN. CITY STAR (Feb. 19, 2013, 7:26PM), http://www.kansas.com/2013/02/19/2682495/kansas-
senate-oks-bill-prohibiting.html; David Sherfinski, Virginia Bill Targets Sex-Selective Abortions: 
Republican’s Measure Would Ban the Practice, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2012), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/oct/16/virginia-bill-targets-sex-selective-abortions-
repu/.  
20. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 947–48 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
21. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874. 
22. Id. at 877–78; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).  
23.  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007); Casey, 505 U.S. at 879; Roe, 410 U.S. at 
146, 149–50.  
24. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852; Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
25. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (holding viability as the appropriate framework for evaluating 
abortion regulations); Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (using a trimester framework for determining 
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can be used,26 and what information the State can require doctors to 
provide pregnant women who are seeking an abortion.27 However, the 
Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on whether a woman’s right to an 
abortion may be restricted based on her personal thoughts. 
This Comment will examine the constitutionality of sex- and race-
selective abortion restrictions. Part I details the state laws restricting sex- 
and race-selective abortions, and the 2011 federal bill. Part II provides 
an overview of the Supreme Court’s right to privacy jurisprudence and 
the doctrinal shifts that have occurred in the Court’s understanding of 
this right. Part III describes the Supreme Court’s evolving jurisprudence 
on abortion, as evidenced by the doctrinal shifts in three landmark 
abortion cases: Roe v. Wade,28 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey,29 and Gonzales v. Carhart.30 Part IV examines 
how, through these cases, the Court has refined the types of individual 
and State interests courts can consider when assessing abortion laws. 
This Comment argues in Part V that the motive-based abortion laws 
infringe on women’s constitutional rights on several grounds. First, a 
woman’s liberty interest in reproductive decisionmaking extends to her 
personal beliefs and thoughts. Second, these laws deprive a woman of 
the chance to obtain an abortion prior to viability once she reveals her 
discriminatory motives. This result conflicts with Casey, in which the 
Court held that the State could not create an absolute bar to obtaining 
abortions previability. Third, the moral interests asserted in these statutes 
are dissimilar from the interests recognized by the Supreme Court in 
Gonzales. Although motive-based abortion laws may find some support 
in that decision—upholding a federal ban on “partial-birth abortions”—
these laws differ from the Partial-Birth Abortion Act in that they do not 
prohibit actions that are analogous to criminal actions, protect women’s 
mental health, or target specific medical procedures. For these reasons, 
this Comment proposes that courts reviewing motive-based abortion 
restrictions should find the laws unconstitutional. 
                                                     
appropriate abortion restrictions). 
26. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 133 (upholding a federal ban on “partial-birth” abortion procedures). 
27. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 880–87 (upholding informed consent and twenty-four-hour waiting 
period requirements); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976) 
(upholding parental notification requirement). 
28. 410 U.S. 113. 
29. 505 U.S. 833. 
30. 550 U.S. 124. 
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I.  STATES ARE INCREASINGLY INTERESTED IN ENACTING 
SEX- AND RACE-SELECTIVE ABORTION LAWS 
Currently, six states ban abortions based on a woman’s motives.31 
Even though some of these laws have existed for several decades, their 
constitutionality has yet to be challenged in court. The increasing 
interest in these laws, as evidenced by several state legislators recently 
proposing similar bills,32 combined with the advances in technology that 
will make more fetal information available at earlier stages of 
pregnancy,33 suggests that courts may have to consider the validity of 
these laws in the near future. 
A. Several States Have Passed Motive-Based Abortion Restrictions 
Illinois became the first state to ban sex-selective abortions in 1975.34 
The law states that “[n]o person shall intentionally perform an abortion 
with knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely 
on account of the sex of the fetus,”35 but contains an exception for 
abortions performed in connection with genetic disorders that are linked 
to sex.36 During Senate debates over the bill, proponents of the law 
focused on the reporting requirements and informed consent provisions 
and gave very little attention to the sex-selection provision of the law.37 
In 1989, Pennsylvania became the second state to ban sex-selective 
                                                     
31. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (2013) (effective July 20, 2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
510/6(8) (2012) (effective Nov. 20, 1975); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-731.2 (2012) (effective Apr. 2, 
2010); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204 (West 2012) (effective as amended Nov. 17, 1989); H.R. 
2253, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2013), available at 
http://www.kslegislature.org/li/b2013_14/measures/documents/hb2253_enrolled.pdf; H.R. 1305, 
63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-
2013/documents/13-0351-02000.pdf?20130417194356; Bill Actions for HB 1305, NORTH DAKOTA 
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH, http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/bill-actions/ba1305.html (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2013); Brownback Signs Sweeping Anti-Abortion Bill, KAN. CITY STAR (Apr. 19, 
2013), http://www.kansascity.com/2013/04/19/4191877/kansas-gov-brownback-signs-
sweeping.html. 
32. See, e.g., S. 529, 2009-2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2010); H.R. 693, 60th Leg., 2d 
Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2010); Assemb. 162, 214th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2010). 
33. See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text.  
34. Kathleen Gilbert, Oklahoma Bans Gender-Selective Abortions, LIFESITENEWS.COM (May 27, 
2009, 11:15 AM), http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/archive/ldn/2009/may/09052708. 
35. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/6(8) (2012). 
36. Id. (“Nothing in Section 6(8) shall be construed to proscribe the performance of an abortion 
on account of the sex of the fetus because of a genetic disorder linked to that sex.”). 
37. See 79TH GEN. ASSEMB., REG. SESS. 97 (Ill. Nov. 19, 1975) (statement of Sen. Egan) (listing 
the “important aspects of the bill” and not mentioning the sex-selection ban). 
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abortion.38 The Abortion Control Act provides that physicians may only 
perform abortions that are deemed “necessary,”39 and stipulates that 
“[n]o abortion which is sought because of the sex of the unborn child 
shall be deemed a necessary abortion.”40 A physician who violates the 
law is guilty of a third-degree felony,41 punishable by up to seven years 
in prison,42 and can have his or her medical license suspended or 
revoked.43 While Planned Parenthood challenged several provisions of 
the law, the sex-selective ban was not included in the suit because it was 
viewed as a provision that did not have a direct impact on women.44 The 
lawyer filing suit on behalf of Planned Parenthood, Linda J. Wharton, 
described the sex-selection provision as a “red herring.”45 
Over a decade went by without any states passing motive-based 
abortion restrictions until, in 2010, the Oklahoma legislature passed a 
law banning sex-selective abortions.46 Another law passed months later 
requires a woman to fill out a lengthy questionnaire before an abortion is 
performed.47 The form, which contains thirty-eight questions, asks about 
the woman’s race, education, income, relationships, and reasons for 
seeking an abortion, and specifically asks whether the woman is 
obtaining an abortion because she wants a child of a different sex.48 The 
                                                     
38. See Gilbert, supra note 34; see also Pennsylvania Abortion Limits Become Law, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 19, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/19/us/pennsylvania-abortion-limits-become-
law.html. 
39. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204(a)(1) (West 2012). 
40. Id. § 3204(c). 
41. Id. § 3204(d). 
42. Id. § 106(b)(4). 
43. Id. § 3204(d). 
44. Michael deCourcy Hinds, Federal Judge Blocks New Anti-Abortion Law in Pennsylvania, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1990, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/12/us/federal-
judge-blocks-a-new-anti-abortion-law-in-
pennsylvania.html?scp=9&sq=pennsylvania+abortion&st=nyt.  
45. Id.  
46. See James C. McKinley, Jr., Strict Abortion Measures Enacted in Oklahoma, N.Y. TIMES, 
April 27, 2010, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/us/28abortion.html?_r=0. 
A state court had found an earlier version of the law unconstitutional based on the state 
constitution’s “single subject” rule for legislation. Barbara Hoberock, Judge Rules Oklahoma Law 
Unconstitutional, TULSA WORLD (Feb. 19, 2010), 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=14&articleid=20100219_14_0_OKLAHO3
98221. The Oklahoma legislature then passed a second version of the sex-selection law that 
remedied the constitutional issue. McKinley, Jr., supra.  
47. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 63, §§ 1-738i–738p (West 2013) (effective Nov. 1, 2010); Oklahoma: 
Veto of Third Abortion Bill is Overridden, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2010, at A19, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/26/us/26brfs-VETOOFTHIRDA_BRF.html.  
48. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 63, § 1-738k(F) (West 2013).  
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law also requires that the results of the questionnaires be reported 
statistically on a state website.49 While reproductive rights groups 
challenged an Oklahoma law passed the same year requiring women to 
undergo an ultrasound before obtaining an abortion,50 to date no legal 
challenge has been brought against either the sex-selection ban or the 
questionnaire requirement. 
In March of 2011, Arizona passed the Susan B. Anthony and 
Frederick Douglass Prenatal Discrimination Act51 making it the first 
state to ban both sex- and race-selective abortions.52 The law imposes 
criminal penalties on anyone who “[p]erforms an abortion knowing that 
the abortion sought is based on the sex or race of the child or the race of 
a parent of that child.”53 The notes appended to the bill summary state 
that “[e]vidence shows that minorities are targeted for abortion and that 
sex-selection abortion is also occurring in our country. There is no place 
for such discrimination and inequality in our society.”54 However, the 
statute does not cite specific evidence to support the assertion that these 
practices are taking place.55 
The Arizona law takes its name from a federal bill that was 
introduced by Arizona Representative Trent Franks in 200956 and 
reintroduced by him in December 2011.57 The federal bill features the 
same statutory language as the Arizona law but includes more 
congressional findings.58 The findings section makes several claims 
                                                     
49. Hoberock, supra note 46. Republican Senator Todd Lamb, the law’s author, stated that the 
questionnaire and reporting requirement are meant to provide more information on why women 
seek abortions and thereby help the state find ways to reduce the number of abortions performed. Id. 
50. Oklahoma Continues Assault on Reproductive Rights, SEXUALITY INFO. & EDUC. COUNCIL 
U.S., http://www.siecus.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Feature.showFeature&featureID=1899 (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2013). 
51. H.R. 2443, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 6 (Ariz. 2011) (enacted). 
52. Arizona: Abortion Banned for Race Selection, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2011, at A14, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/us/31brfs-ABORTIONBANN_BRF.html. 
53. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02(A)(1) (2013). The law also provides a private cause of 
action against the doctor who performed the procedure to the husband of the woman and, if the 
woman is unmarried, her parents. Id. § 13-3603.02(C). 
54. Ariz. H.R. 2443.  
55. Id.  
56. Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act, H.R. 1822, 111th 
Cong. (2009); SUJATHA JESUDASON & SUSANNAH BARUCH, GENERATIONS AHEAD, RACE AND SEX 
SELECTION IN ABORTION DEBATES: THE LEGISLATION AND THE BILLBOARDS 3 (2011). 
57. Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of 2011, H.R. 
3541, 112th Cong. (2011); Stephanie Mencimer, Behind the GOP’s Civil Rights Crusade, MOTHER 
JONES (Dec. 27, 2011), http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/12/race-gender-selection-abortion-
bills-trent-franks. 
58. Compare Ariz. H.B. 2443, with H.R. 3541, § 2(a). 
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about the practice of sex- and race-selective abortions in the United 
States.59 It describes sex-selection abortion as “barbaric,” and asserts that 
while sex is ascertainable at the earliest stages of pregnancy, most sex-
selective abortions occur in the second or third trimester of pregnancy.60 
The findings cite a 2008 study that found evidence of sex-selection in 
immigrant families that already had multiple daughters.61 The bill also 
describes race-selective abortion as a “barbaric” practice, but does not 
cite any studies showing that race-selective abortions occur in the United 
States.62 
Arguments in favor of restrictions on race-selective abortions are 
linked to larger arguments made by anti-abortion organizations 
regarding racial targeting by abortion providers. These arguments frame 
the reproductive rights movement, led in part by the work of Margaret 
Sanger, as part of a larger eugenics campaign.63 Anti-abortion 
organizations also point to the larger numbers of abortions performed on 
minority women in the United States as evidence of providers 
purposefully “targeting” these populations.64 Opponents of these race-
selective restrictions have noted that these arguments do not seem to 
address the central issue of whether women are obtaining abortions 
because of the race of the fetus.65 In this sense, the arguments in favor of 
race-selection abortion restrictions are markedly different from those in 
favor of restrictions on sex-selective abortions, in that they seem to 
largely focus on the motives of the abortion providers rather than those 
                                                     
59. H.R. 3541,§ 2(a)(1)(C)–(F). 
60. Id. § 2(a)(1)(D).  
61. Id. § 2(a)(1)(F) (referencing Douglas Almond & Lena Edlund, Son-Based Sex Ratios in the 
2000 United States Census, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5681 (2008), available at 
http://www.pnas.org/content/105/15/5681). 
62. Id. § 2(a)(2)(C). 
63. The Mother of Planned Parenthood, TOOMANYABORTED.COM, 
http://www.toomanyaborted.com/plannedparenthood/sanger/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2013) (“To carry 
out her population control plans, [Margaret Sanger’s] organization, American Birth Control League 
that she founded in 1921, opened its facilities in predominantly black, immigrant and poor area [sic] 
of New York City.”). 
64. Hearing on H.R. 3451 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 83 (2011) (statement of Stephen H. Aden, Vice President/Senior Counsel, 
Alliance Defense Fund) (“[A]bortion clinics are located in disproportionately minority 
neighborhoods, somewhere between 70 and 80 percent. A lot of us believe that has been intentional; 
that has been a policy on the part of Planned Parenthood and other abortion providers.”). 
65. Id. at 23 (statement of Rep. Mike Quigley) (“On the issue of the supposed race-based 
abortions, the entire premise of the bill is wrongheaded. I must assume that the writers of the bill 
don’t mean to imply that women of color would choose abortion as some sort of self-afflicted 
genocide.”). 
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of the women themselves.66 
Before the U.S. House of Representatives voted on the bill in 2012, 
Representative Franks removed the provisions regarding race-selective 
abortion.67 He claimed in an interview that opponents of the measure had 
“manipulated” the race issue.68 The revised bill failed to pass the 
House.69 After the vote, a member of the Senate introduced a similar bill 
targeting sex-selection,70 which also failed to pass.71 
In 2013, North Dakota and Kansas both passed motive-based abortion 
restrictions.72 The Kansas law only prohibits sex-selective abortions,73 
while the North Dakota law bans abortions based on sex-selection or 
genetic defects.74 The North Dakota law is the first in the nation to ban 
abortions based on genetic abnormalities,75 which the statute defines as 
“any defect, disease, or disorder that is inherited genetically,” including 
“any physical disfigurement, scoliosis, dwarfism, Down syndrome, 
albinism, amelia, or any other type of physical or mental disability, 
abnormality, or disease.”76 At a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, 
                                                     
66. See Dewan, supra note 11 (“Abortion opponents say the number is so high because abortion 
clinics are deliberately located in black neighborhoods and prey upon black women.”). 
67. Napp Nazworth, Rep. Trent Franks on Why Race-Based Abortion Ban Was Removed from 
Bill, CHRISTIAN POST (May 31, 2012, 7:17 AM), http://www.christianpost.com/news/rep-trent-
franks-on-why-race-based-abortion-ban-was-removed-from-bill-75804/. Representative Franks 
stated that he removed the race provisions because “[t]he left wing in the House wanted to make the 
race [issue] completely something else than it was.” Id.  
68. Id. 
69. Ed O’Keefe, Bill Banning ‘Sex-Selective Abortions’ Fails in the House, WASH. POST (May 
31, 2012, 2:36 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/bill-banning-sex-
selective-abortions-fails-in-the-house/2012/05/31/gJQAgCYn4U_blog.html.  
70. Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA), S. 3290, 112th Cong. (2012); Elise Viebeck, 
Sex-Selective Abortion Issue Hits Senate, HILL (June 14, 2012, 8:41 AM), http://thehill.com/ 
blogs/healthwatch/abortion/232727-sex-selective-abortion-issue-hits-senate. 
71. See S.3290 - Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2012, CONGRESS.GOV, 
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-bill/3290 (last visited Apr. 7, 2013). 
72. H.R. 2253, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2013) (enacted), available at 
http://www.kslegislature.org/li/b2013_14/measures/documents/hb2253_enrolled.pdf; (last visited 
May 12, 2013); H.R. 1305, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (enacted), available at 
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-0351-02000.pdf?20130417194356; HB 
2253, KANSAS LEGISLATURE, http://www.kslegislature.org/li/b2013_14/measures/hb2253/ (last 
visited May 23, 2013); Bill Actions for HB 1305, NORTH DAKOTA LEGIS. BRANCH, 
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/bill-actions/ba1305.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2013). 
73. Kan. H.R. 2253. 
74. N.D. Governor Approves 6-Week Abortion Ban, Says Constitutionality is “Open Question,” 
CBSNEWS.COM (Mar. 26, 2013, 1:10 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57576359/n.d-
governor-approves-6-week-abortion-ban-says-constitutionality-is-open-question/.  
75. Eligon & Eckholm, supra note 10.  
76. N.D. H.R. 1305. 
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one speaker characterized the abortion rates for children with Down 
syndrome as “simply a modern version of eugenics.”77 Opponents of the 
bill noted that many of the genetic defects listed in the bill result in the 
child dying in the womb or shortly after birth.78 
Currently, only a small minority of states have motive-based 
restrictions on abortion,79 but this number may increase in the future. 
During 2011, eight other states attempted to pass similar legislation, 
though none of the bills passed.80 Anti-abortion organizations are also 
lobbying on the broader issue of selective abortions.81 No legal challenge 
has been brought against a race- or sex-selective abortion restriction, and 
any future challenge may require courts to reexamine the nature of the 
constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy.82 
II.   THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY WAS 
FOUNDED ON PRINCIPLES OF REPRODUCTIVE 
AUTONOMY 
Roe v. Wade, the landmark case recognizing the right to terminate a 
pregnancy, framed the right as an extension of the “right to privacy.”83 
The Court first used this term in the context of reproductive autonomy in 
Griswold v. Connecticut,84 a case declaring that married couples had the 
                                                     
77. Nick Smith, Abortion Bills Kick Up Debate, BISMARCK TRIB. (March 12, 2013, 11:14 PM),  
http://bismarcktribune.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/abortion-bills-kick-up-
debate/article_706928b8-8b94-11e2-9ae8-0019bb2963f4.html.  
78. Id.  
79. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (20132) (effective July 20, 2011); 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 510/6(8) (2012) (effective Nov. 20, 1975); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-731.2 (2012) (effective 
Apr. 2, 2010); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204 (West 2012) (effective as amended Nov. 17, 1989); 
H.R. 2253, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2013), available at 
http://www.kslegislature.org/li/b2013_14/measures/documents/hb2253_enrolled.pdf; H.R. 1305, 
63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-
2013/documents/13-0351-02000.pdf?20130417194356. 
80. See O’Keefe, supra note 69; see also King, supra note 8, at 27 n.131.  
81. See, e.g., AM. UNITED FOR LIFE, BAN ON ABORTIONS FOR SEX SELECTION AND GENETIC 
ABNORMALITIES: MODEL LEGISLATION & POLICE GUIDE FOR THE 2013 LEGISLATIVE YEAR 9 
(2013), available at http://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Sex-Selective-and-Genetic-
Abnormality-Ban-2013-LG.pdf.  
82. Representative Franks has not been discreet about these larger motives behind the bill. See 
Rep. Trent Franks: ‘Predna’ [sic] Would ‘Blow a Fatal Hole in Roe v. Wade,’ WASH. INDEP. (Mar. 
18, 2011, 1:20 PM), http://washingtonindependent.com/106651/rep-trent-franks-predna-would-
blow-a-fatal-hole-in-roe-v-wade. 
83. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973). 
84. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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right to use contraception.85 By the time Roe was decided, the concept of 
the “right to privacy” was firmly rooted in the Court’s substantive due 
process jurisprudence.86 The right protected a wide range of individual 
rights in the areas of procreation,87 contraception,88 marriage,89 and 
family upbringing.90 These precedents established a foundation to 
support the development of the right to privacy in the abortion context.91 
This section outlines the origins of the right to privacy as it pertains to 
reproductive rights and intimate relationships prior to Roe. 
A.  Early Cases Protecting Familial Autonomy and Procreation Relied 
on General Notions of Liberty 
Before dealing with issues such as abortion or contraception, the 
Court in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was already 
taking part in the “nascent constitutionalization” of liberty rights in both 
the economic and social realms.92 During the “Lochner era,”93 the Court 
read the “liberty” of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as 
protecting numerous economic rights.94 Meanwhile, the Court 
                                                     
85.  Id. at 484–85. 
86. See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–49 (1992). The 
doctrine of substantive due process provides that legislation that intrudes on “fundamental rights” 
must be subject to strict scrutiny. See id. (distinguishing the procedural and substantive components 
of the Due Process Clause); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 812–13 (4th ed. 2011). Over the years, the Court has devised different methods for 
identifying fundamental rights, and has recognized rights protected under the Due Process Clauses 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 812–13. 
87. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942).  
88. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 (1972); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86. 
89. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). 
90. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923).  
91. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (noting that “[o]ur law affords constitutional protection to personal 
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and 
education”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (noting that the right to privacy extends to 
activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and 
education).  
92. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional 
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2236 (2002). 
93. “Lochner” refers to the Court’s decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in 
which the Court declared unconstitutional a New York law that limited the number of hours bakers 
could work based on the principles of freedom of contract. Id. at 61. The term “Lochner era” refers 
to a period in which the Court closely scrutinized and often struck down economic legislation on the 
grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment protected a right to contract. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
86, at 630–31.  
94. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (“right to contract,” “right to purchase and sell labor”); Allgeyer 
 
15 - Gillette Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/11/2013  5:04 PM 
2013] PREGNANT AND PREJUDICED 657 
 
interpreted this same “liberty” to protect non-economic rights, such as 
the right to bodily integrity95 and the right to familial control.96 Although 
the Court later extinguished many of the economic liberty rights,97 it 
continued to recognize liberty interests in non-economic forms. 
Prior to its decision in Griswold, the Court recognized a right to 
marry,98 a right to procreate,99 and a right to control the education of 
one’s children.100 The Court relied on notions of “natural dut[ies]” and 
commonly shared values and practices when expounding these new 
rights,101 and occasionally acknowledged the inchoate nature of this area 
of law.102 In Meyer v. Nebraska,103 the majority noted that “[w]hile this 
Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus 
guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the 
included things have been definitely stated.”104 Although the exact scope 
of these liberty rights was not fully defined, the Court’s decisions 
established a “private realm of family life which the state cannot 
enter.”105 When the Supreme Court announced a “right to privacy” in 
Griswold, the Court fashioned a right to privacy by combining “well-
respected constitutional privacy notions—primarily drawing from Fourth 
and First Amendment cases—with forgotten turn-of-the-century ‘liberty’ 
cases under the Fourteenth Amendment,” involving marriage, 
procreation, and family governance.106 
                                                     
v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897) (“liberty to contract”). 
95. See Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No right is held more sacred, or 
is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession 
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and 
unquestionable authority of law.”). The liberty interest in bodily integrity has been discussed in 
more recent cases as well. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (“One aspect 
of this liberty is a right to bodily integrity, a right to control one’s person.”); Washington v. Harper, 
494 U.S. 210, 221–22, 229 (1990). 
96. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923).  
97. Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1397 (1992). 
98. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). 
99. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942). 
100. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (invalidating a state law requiring children to attend public schools); 
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (invalidating a state law that prohibited non-English teaching in schools). 
101. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400 (“The American people have always regarded education and 
acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance . . . . [I]t is the natural duty of the parent 
to give his children education suitable to their station in life.”). 
102. Id. at 399. 
103. 262 U.S. 390. 
104. Id.  
105. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).  
106. Gormley, supra note 97, at 1396.  
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B.  Contraception Became a Component of Liberty in Griswold and 
Eisenstadt v. Baird 
The Court’s decision in Griswold established the right to privacy as a 
constitutional doctrine, and broadened the right to include the use of 
contraception. The Court struck down a law that prohibited the 
distribution and sale of contraceptives on grounds that it violated the 
right to privacy.107 The Court’s initial articulation of the right was 
framed in spatial terms, as it was limited to the confines of the marital 
bedroom.108 The Court later expanded the scope of the right to privacy in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird,109 by striking down a Massachusetts law that 
prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals.110 
The Court held that “the right of the individual, married or single, to be 
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child.”111 
Unlike the previous cases recognizing fundamental rights in familial 
autonomy, which the Court held to be an aspect of “liberty” protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to privacy was not originally based 
on a specific constitutional provision.112 Justice Douglas, writing for the 
majority in Griswold, explained that the right was instead found within 
the “penumbras” of several constitutional provisions.113 The Eisenstadt 
Court ruled that the state law violated the Equal Protection Clause, rather 
than the Due Process Clause, by invidiously discriminating on the basis 
of marital status.114 However, these cases did provide a doctrinal 
foundation for the Court’s decision in Roe, as the Roe Court viewed the 
right to terminate a pregnancy as a logical extension of the earlier right 
to privacy cases.115 
                                                     
107. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
108. See id. at 485–86 (holding that these disparate constitutional amendments created a “zone of 
privacy” that protected the “privacy surrounding the marriage relationship”). 
109. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
110. Id. at 453. 
111. Id.  
112. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484–85 (“The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the 
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them 
life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy.” (citations omitted)). Justice 
Douglas described the right as emanating from several constitutional amendments, including the 
First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Id. 
113. Id.  
114. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454–55. 
115. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (noting that “the right [of personal privacy] has 
some extension to activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, 
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III.  SINCE ROE, THE SUPREME COURT HAS ALLOWED 
INCREASINGLY RESTRICTIVE ABORTION LAWS 
The Court first recognized the right to an abortion in Roe, but even in 
its original form, the right was qualified by State interests.116 The 
Court’s abortion jurisprudence is marked by the Court’s evolving ideas 
about the nature of several competing interests, including the woman’s 
interest in reproductive autonomy, and the State interest in protecting 
fetal life.117 Roe provided a trimester framework for analyzing the 
constitutionality of abortion restrictions, and posited that the State 
interest in fetal life is greater during later stages of pregnancy.118 Over 
time, however, the Court has revised its jurisprudence and provided 
more open-textured standards for analyzing abortion laws which allow 
for greater State involvement at earlier stages of a woman’s 
pregnancy.119 
A.  The Court Established the Right to Terminate a Pregnancy in Roe 
v. Wade 
The Roe Court announced that the “right of privacy . . . is broad 
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate 
her pregnancy.”120 The Court described the right as an extension of 
earlier cases finding a right to privacy in familial and reproductive 
matters.121 Because the liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment already covered a right to use contraception and to raise 
children according to one’s views, the Court concluded that even more 
fundamental reproductive rights, such as the decision of whether to carry 
a pregnancy to term, were also included under the Due Process 
Clause.122 However, the Court stipulated that the right “is not 
unqualified and must be considered against important State interests in 
                                                     
and child rearing and education” (internal citations omitted)).  
116. Id. at 153–54.  
117. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007) (woman’s mental and physical 
health); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (reproductive 
autonomy); Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (fetal life).  
118. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
119. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (replacing the Roe trimester framework with the undue burden 
test). 
120. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
121. Id. at 152–53.  
122. Id.  
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regulation.”123 
The trimester framework created in Roe was based on the Court’s 
belief that the State interest in regulating fetal life increased as the fetus 
developed.124 Therefore, the State could not regulate abortions until after 
the first trimester.125 After this point, the State could only regulate “to 
the extent that the regulation reasonably relate[d] to the preservation and 
protection of maternal health.”126 The Court went on to hold that after 
the second trimester, when the fetus would reach “viability,” a State 
could regulate to protect fetal life.127 The Court explained that a fetus 
becomes viable when it is “potentially able to live outside the mother’s 
womb, albeit with artificial aid.”128 After viability, a State could go so 
far as to prohibit abortion, as long as it left an exception for cases in 
which the procedure was required to preserve the life or health of the 
mother.129 
B.  Casey’s “Undue Burden” Standard Permits Previability Abortion 
Regulations 
The Court disposed of the trimester framework in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, concluding that the Roe approach did not 
sufficiently articulate the State interest in fetal life.130 Under Casey, a 
State still could not prohibit abortions prior to viability;131 however, it 
could regulate abortions prior to viability in ways that would not 
constitute an “undue burden” for the woman seeking an abortion.132 The 
Court defined “undue burden” as any regulation that “has the purpose or 
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion of a nonviable fetus.”133 Regulations that instead serve “to 
                                                     
123. Id. at 154. 
124. Id. at 162–63. 
125. Id. at 163 (“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in the health of the 
mother, the ‘compelling’ point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the 
end of the first trimester.”). 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 160. The Court stated that this point is usually around seven months (twenty-eight 
weeks) into a pregnancy, but can occur earlier. Id. 
129. Id. at 163–64.  
130. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870–71 (1992).  
131. Id. at 860. The Casey Court also acknowledged that what constituted “viability” in the 1990s 
was different from its meaning in 1973 (the year Roe was decided), and that viability now occurred 
usually at twenty-three to twenty-four weeks. Id. 
132. Id. at 876. 
133. Id. at 877. 
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inform the woman’s free choice” or to “persuade her to choose 
childbirth over abortion” are permissible under Casey as long as the 
measures do not present a substantial obstacle.134 While only a plurality 
of the Court reached this holding, it was re-affirmed by a majority of the 
Court several years later.135 
The Court has upheld several state abortion laws based on the undue 
burden test provided in Casey. For example, the Court upheld state laws 
that require doctors to inform the woman of the availability of materials 
regarding the physical characteristics of the fetus,136 require women to 
wait twenty-four hours before undergoing the procedure,137 and require 
minors to obtain parental consent and notification.138 Nevertheless, the 
Court has also struck down several regulations under this standard, such 
as the spousal notification requirement in Casey.139 
While the Casey plurality revised the standards by which courts 
would analyze abortion laws and abandoned Roe’s trimester framework, 
it also upheld many of Roe’s basic principles. First, the Court 
emphasized that women still have the right to reproductive autonomy 
prior to fetal viability.140 In fact, the plurality provided a more extensive 
discussion on the importance of this right than did the Roe majority.141 
Second, the Casey Court reaffirmed viability as the proper point in 
which the State could enact restrictions on available abortion 
                                                     
134. Id. at 877–78. 
135. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000) (affirming the holding of Casey with 
respect to viability and the undue burden standard).  
136. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885–86. The “informed consent” provision in Casey also required that 
women be provided with information regarding childbirth and a list of adoption providers. Id. at 
881. 
137. Id. at 885–86 (“The idea that important decisions will be more informed and deliberate if 
they follow some period of reflection does not strike us as unreasonable . . . .”). 
138. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 326–27 (2006). 
139. Casey, 505 U.S. at 887–98. Justice O’Connor reasoned that spouses in “well-functioning 
marriages” would discuss the abortion procedure. Id. at 892–93. However, the fact that millions of 
women who are victims of domestic violence would likely fear notifying an abusive husband 
supported the conclusion that the requirement would “operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s 
choice to undergo an abortion.” Id. at 895. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing in a partial dissent, 
disagreed with this conclusion, and reasoned that the spousal notification requirement “is a rational 
attempt by the State to improve truthful communication between spouses and encourage 
collaborative decisionmaking.” Id. at 975 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part).  
140. Id. at 848–53. 
141. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under 
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1770 (2008) (noting that Casey “presents itself as respecting 
women’s decisional autonomy even as to the procedures the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act 
regulates”). 
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procedures,142 meaning the State cannot ban abortions before the fetus 
reaches viability.143 Casey also upheld the necessity of a health 
exception in laws that restrict access to abortion after viability.144 
C.  The Court Approved Prohibitions on Specific Abortion Procedures 
Based on Moral Grounds in Gonzales 
In 2007, the Supreme Court challenged many of the central principles 
of its abortion jurisprudence in Gonzales v. Carhart,145 in which the 
Court upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.146 The federal 
law prohibited abortion methods which involve the extraction of the 
intact fetus, known as intact dilation and extraction (intact D&E) (or 
“partial-birth”147 abortion).148 The Gonzales Court upheld the law, 
concluding that the regulation furthered a legitimate State interest in 
protecting the life of the fetus as well as the mental health of the 
woman.149 The Court reasoned that Congress had a sufficient basis to 
conclude that the procedure was highly similar to infanticide, an act that 
is criminally actionable.150 The Court held that Congress has the ability 
to “draw[] boundaries to prevent certain practices that extinguish life and 
are close to actions that are condemned.”151 Also, by prohibiting a 
“gruesome and inhumane” abortion procedure,152 the Court concluded 
that the State was protecting the pregnant woman from potential 
emotional harm.153 
Both Justices and scholars have criticized the Gonzales majority’s 
                                                     
142. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860, 870. 
143. Id. at 870. 
144. Id. at 846 (holding that a State can restrict abortions after fetal viability “if the law contains 
exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or health”).  
145. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
146. Id. at 168.  
147. “The term ‘partial-birth abortion’ was invented for purposes of writing legislation. There is 
no textbook reference to any operative procedure or medical state called ‘partial birth.’” Cynthia 
Gorney, Gambling with Abortion: Why Both Sides Think They Have Everything to Lose, HARPER’S 
MAGAZINE, Nov. 2004, at 33, available at http://www.harpers.org/archive/ 2004/11/0080278. 
148. Id. at 137–38. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, provides a lengthy and detailed 
description of the procedure in his opinion. Id.  
149. Id. at 157–61. For a discussion of the State interest in women’s mental health, see supra Part 
II.B.  
150. 550 U.S. at 158. 
151. Id.  
152. Id. at 141 (quoting Partial-Birth Abortion Act, Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201, 1201 
(2003)).  
153. Id. at 159–61. 
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reasoning. Justice Ginsburg in dissent, joined by three other Justices, 
accused the Court of breaking with precedent by allowing moral 
concerns to effectively decide the case.154 Additionally, she argued that 
the majority’s decision in Gonzales did not comport with precedent 
because the intact D&E law did not provide a medical exception for the 
woman.155 Justice Ginsburg also noted that the Casey decision “blurs the 
line . . . between previability and postviability abortions.”156 
The plurality dismissed this argument by finding that Congress could 
conclude that, in light of medical uncertainty, the practice was never 
medically necessary.157 Therefore, the plurality found that the ban on 
this particular procedure did not infringe on a woman’s constitutional 
right to terminate a pregnancy previability, as she would theoretically 
have access to other procedures and would not be entirely unable to 
receive an abortion.158 The majority did leave open the possibility, 
however, that the law’s lack of a health exception could be subject to an 
as-applied challenge in the future.159 The dissent sharply criticized the 
majority’s analysis regarding the health exception issue, pointing out 
that the physicians who testified that intact D&E was never medically 
necessary had little authority for their opinions, and that there was 
“significant medical authority” to support the conclusion that the 
procedure was medically necessary in certain cases.160 
IV.  THE COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE RECOGNIZES 
COMPETING INDIVIDUAL AND STATE INTERESTS 
The Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence is characterized by the 
balancing of competing interests: the woman’s interest in reproductive 
autonomy, and the State interest in fetal life and in the woman’s health. 
Over time, the Court has refined its understanding of these interests. In 
order to analyze whether motive-based abortion restrictions pass 
constitutional muster, a closer look at the nature and scope of these 
interests is required. 
                                                     
154. Id. at 182 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
155. Id. at 161–67; id. at 179 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for “defy[ing] the 
Court’s longstanding precedent affirming the necessity of a health exception”).  
156. Id. at 171; id. at 186–87 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
157. Id. at 166–67 (plurality opinion).  
158. Id. at 164 (“Alternatives are available to the prohibited procedure.”). 
159. Id. at 167.  
160. Id. at 180 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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A.  Women’s Constitutional Right to Reproductive Autonomy Is 
Related to Liberty and Privacy 
The Court’s inconsistent terminology regarding the constitutional 
right to reproductive autonomy precludes a concise definition of the 
right. From Roe to Gonzales, the Court has discussed a woman’s right as 
stemming from both privacy and liberty rights.161 Additionally, the Court 
has provided numerous iterations of the right, describing it as the right to 
exercise “control over [one’s] destiny,”162 “the right to choose,”163 and 
“the freedom to decide matters of the highest privacy and the most 
personal nature.”164 This lack of definitional consistency has also been 
subject to criticism.165 A close look at the Court’s articulation of the 
woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy shows that principles of liberty 
and privacy undergird the constitutional right. 
1.  Current Abortion Jurisprudence Focuses Primarily on the 
Woman’s Liberty Rather Than Privacy 
Earlier cases involving reproductive decisionmaking framed the 
constitutional right as one of privacy.166 Although the Griswold majority 
located the right to privacy in numerous constitutional amendments,167 
the Court later changed course in Roe and located the right within the 
liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.168 In this sense, once Roe was decided, the right to privacy 
became a component of a larger liberty guarantee. But framing women’s 
reproductive rights primarily in terms of privacy rather than liberty 
                                                     
161. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883, 846 (1992); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
162. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869. 
163. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000).  
164. Casey, 505 U.S. at 915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). 
165. Some Justices have criticized the Court’s approach to substantive due process and 
reproductive rights on these very grounds. Justice Scalia’s scathing dissent in Casey reflects this 
judgment: 
The emptiness of the “reasoned judgment” that produced Roe is displayed in plain view by the 
fact that, after more than 19 years of effort by some of the brightest (and most determined) 
legal minds in the country, after more than 10 cases upholding abortion rights in this Court . . . 
the best the Court can do to explain how it is that the word “liberty” must be thought to include 
the right to destroy human fetuses is to rattle off a collection of adjectives that simply decorate 
a value judgment and conceal a political choice. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 883, 983 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
166. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. 
167. Id. at 484–85. 
168. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973). 
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created a certain degree of doctrinal confusion.169 Many scholars and 
commentators criticized Roe for applying the right to privacy to actions 
that had little to do with common understandings of the term.170 Justice 
Stevens, as both a federal appeals judge and a Supreme Court Justice, 
stated that liberty, rather than privacy, was a more appropriate term in 
discussing substantive due process rights.171 
Since Roe, the Court has frequently discussed women’s reproductive 
rights in terms of liberty interests rather than the right to privacy.172 
Professor Jamal Greene of Columbia Law School points out that the 
Court shifted away from referring to the right to privacy in several non-
abortion cases leading up to Casey.173 In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri 
Department of Health,174 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that although 
many state courts analyzed a right to refuse medical treatment under a 
“generalized constitutional right of privacy,” the right would be analyzed 
by the Court “in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.”175 
The Casey plurality finalized this change in terminology, stating that 
“[t]he controlling word in the cases before us is ‘liberty.’”176 As 
Professor Greene notes, the Court only uses the term “privacy” twice in 
Casey.177 Even Justices frequently sympathetic to protecting Roe shifted 
away from using privacy as the primary justification for a woman’s 
constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy.178 Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent in Gonzales emphasized that “legal challenges to undue 
restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some 
generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s 
autonomy to determine her life’s course.”179 
                                                     
169. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1302 (2d ed. 1998) (“Much 
judicial and scholarly ink has been spilt in the task of expounding this paradoxical right.”); Anita L. 
Allen, Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 
461, 461 (1987).  
170. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE 
L.J. 920, 929 (1973). 
171. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem’l Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719 (7th Cir. 1975).  
172. Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 715, 725 (2010).  
173. Id. at 724–25. The Court conspicuously failed to mention the right to privacy in cases 
involving maternity leave and family organization. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 
(1977) (striking down public housing eligibility requirement); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 
414 U.S. 632 (1974) (invalidating school board’s maternity leave policy). 
174. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
175. Id. at 279 n.7. 
176. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883, 846 (1992). 
177. Greene, supra note 172, at 728.  
178. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
179. Id. 
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However, while the Court speaks largely in the argot of liberty and 
autonomy when discussing the right to choose an abortion, the discourse 
of privacy still remains within the Court’s decisions.180 Supreme Court 
Justices have frequently highlighted the connection between these two 
values.181 In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists,182 Justice Blackmun wrote that there are few decisions 
“more personal and intimate, more properly private” than the right to 
determine whether to end a pregnancy.183 Justice Stevens, writing a 
partial concurrence and dissent in Casey, emphasized that the “[t]he 
woman’s constitutional liberty interest also involves her freedom to 
decide matters of the highest privacy and the most personal nature.”184 
These passages suggest that the right to autonomous decisionmaking, 
while primarily an issue of liberty, still stems in part from the private 
nature of the subject matter at issue. 
2.  The Liberty Interest Encompasses the Right to Decisional 
Autonomy in Reproductive Matters 
In Roe and Casey, the Court enshrined the principle that women have 
the constitutional right to choose whether or not to continue a 
pregnancy.185 The Roe Court reasoned that the fundamental nature of 
this right stemmed in part from the drastic consequences that may flow 
from the inability to exercise the right: forcing a woman to keep an 
unwanted pregnancy can take a serious toll on the her physical and 
psychological health.186 Justice O’Connor noted in Casey that the cases 
involving the right to privacy and contraception were directly linked to 
the abortion cases, as all of the cases affirmed women’s liberty to make 
“personal decisions concerning not only the meaning of procreation but 
also human responsibility and respect for it.”187 
The Casey plurality’s emphasis on the philosophical aspects of liberty 
comports with the concept of decisional autonomy. Given that the choice 
                                                     
180. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986). 
181. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772. 
182. 476 U.S. 747. 
183. Id. at 772 (emphasis added). 
184. Casey, 505 U.S. at 915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis 
added). 
185. Id. at 870 (plurality opinion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).  
186. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
187. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853. 
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to terminate a pregnancy frequently involves the personal values and 
beliefs of the woman, the Court stressed that liberty includes the right to 
have independent and personal views on larger philosophical matters.188 
The Court explained that the “destiny of the woman must be shaped to a 
large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her 
place in society.”189 Justice O’Connor, writing for the Casey plurality, 
characterized the decision to terminate a pregnancy as a highly personal 
decision that is directly tied to subjective beliefs of the individual: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices 
a person may make in a lifetime, . . . are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty 
is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. 
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of 
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the state.190 
In sum, the Casey Court suggested that women’s liberty interest extends 
to a woman’s beliefs on matters relevant to her decisionmaking on 
whether to terminate her pregnancy through an abortion.191 
The Court’s conception of liberty works in conjunction with ideas 
about the allocation of decision-making power between the State and the 
individual.192 The Court has described right to privacy in terms of a 
“private sphere of individual liberty” that is kept “beyond the reach of 
government.”193 Casey affirmed that when it comes to reproductive 
rights, the State cannot insist on “its own vision of the woman’s role, 
however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and 
our culture.”194 
B.  The Supreme Court Has Identified a State Interest in Protecting 
Fetal Life 
Over the past several decades, the Court has developed the contours 
of the State interest in regulating abortion. Through this development, 
                                                     
188. Id. at 851–52.  
189. Id. at 852 (emphasis added). 
190. Id. at 851. 
191. Id.  
192. See TRIBE, supra note 169, at 1352 (“[T]he issue of individual autonomy–of control over 
one’s body and reproductive destiny–is in turn a question of power, pure and simple.”); Allen, supra 
note 169, at 465–66; Greene, supra note 172, at 724 (“In a liberal society, an individual decision 
either to risk or to invite pregnancy is simply not the community’s to make . . . .”). 
193. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986).  
194. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. 
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two interrelated interests have emerged: the State interest in protecting 
fetal life, and the State interest in preserving the woman’s health.195 The 
Court has allowed increased regulation of abortions based on both of 
these interests.196 
Casey marked a major expansion of the State interest in fetal life, as 
the Court recognized that this interest exists even during the first 
trimester of a pregnancy.197 Roe established that the State had a 
recognized interest in promoting and protecting fetal life but limited the 
interest to the second and third trimesters, with a stronger interest in later 
stages of pregnancy.198 It was not until the third trimester, when the fetus 
reached viability, that the State could go so far as to outlaw abortion as 
long as there was an exception that would allow abortions for medical 
emergencies.199 The Court reasoned that it is not until the fetus “has the 
capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb” that the State 
interest in fetal life outweighs the woman’s interest in reproductive 
autonomy.200 Hence, under Roe, the State interest in fetal life was 
directly correlated with the fetus’s biological development.201 
The Court expanded this interest in Casey by recognizing that the 
State interest in promoting respect for human life exists at “the earliest 
stages of pregnancy,”202 and that the Roe trimester framework was too 
“rigid” to fully account for the State interest.203 Because the State now 
had an interest in fetal life at earlier stages of pregnancy, the plurality 
held that the State could create “structural mechanisms” by which to 
“express profound respect for the life of the unborn.”204 
Gonzales further expanded the State interest in fetal life by 
recognizing that the interest allows the State to prohibit abortion 
procedures that are deemed “brutal and inhumane” and that can have a 
harmful effect on societal values.205 The Court afforded considerable 
                                                     
195. Id. at 846 (O’Connor, J., writing for the Court) (“[T]he State has legitimate interests from 
the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may 
become a child.” (emphasis added)). 
196. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157, 159 (2007). 
197. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872. 
198. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1972). 
199. Id. at 163.  
200. Id. 
201. Id. (noting that “[s]tate regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical 
and biological justifications”). 
202. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.  
203. Id. at 872–73. 
204. Id. at 877–78. 
205. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007).  
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deference to Congress to determine what kinds of medical procedures 
would fall into this category of morally actionable practices warranting 
State prohibition.206 In Gonzales, the Court approved of Congress’s 
decision to ban procedures that were similar to infanticide and compared 
the intact D&E procedure to state prohibition of assisted suicide.207 
Justice Kennedy posited that by allowing procedures that so closely 
resembled infanticide to be performed, those procedures will “further 
coarsen society to the humanity of . . . all vulnerable and innocent 
human life.”208 
Although some scholars have praised the reasoning in Gonzales as 
reflecting commonly held moral beliefs,209 many scholars have criticized 
this morality-based reasoning for being too subjective and for 
contradicting Court precedent.210 Professor Sonia Suter of George 
Washington University Law School argued that this morality-based 
standard “offers no clear boundaries or analytical framework for 
assessing when something is morally problematic” and that it “raises the 
problems of moral relativism.”211 Others critique the reasoning in 
Gonzales because it purportedly conflicts with Court precedent on the 
imposition of moral codes through legislation.212 Justice Ginsburg, in her 
dissent, rebuked the Gonzales majority on this point: 
Ultimately, the Court admits that “moral concerns” are at work, 
concerns that could yield prohibitions on any abortion. Notably, 
the concerns expressed are untethered to any ground genuinely 
serving the Government’s interest in preserving life. By 
allowing such concerns to carry the day and case, overriding 
                                                     
206. Id. at 163.  
207. Id. at 158 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732–735 (1997)). The Court did 
not mention one crucial difference between intact D&E and assisted suicide, which is that the 
former “is concerned with the life of an entity recognized as a person by law.” Rebecca E. Ivey, 
Note, Destabilizing Discourses: Blocking and Exploiting a New Discourse at Work in Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 94 VA. L. REV. 1451, 1459 (2008). 
208. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157.  
209. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils of Constitutional Law, 
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 519, 569–70 (2008) (“Justice Kennedy’s . . . political instincts seem 
sound. . . . [H]e has roughly articulated the mainstream American view: allow women to choose 
abortion in the early period of pregnancy, but recognize the government’s interest in expressing its 
citizens’ moral condemnation of partial-birth abortion.”). 
210. E.g., Sonia M. Suter, The “Repugnance” Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart and Other Theories of 
Reproductive Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1514, 1583–84 (2008).  
211. Id.  
212. Id.; see also Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 182 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
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fundamental rights, the Court dishonors our precedent.213 
Ginsburg cites to Casey, which rejected an approach that would allow 
“principles of morality” and “moral code[s]” to dictate abortion 
regulation,214 and Lawrence v. Texas,215 which rejected State action that 
used criminal law to enforce “ethical and moral principles.”216 
C. The State Has an Interest in Women’s Physical and Mental Health 
In addition to recognizing the State interest in protecting fetal life, the 
Court has recognized a State interest in protecting the health, both 
physical and mental, of the woman seeking an abortion.217 Initially, this 
interest focused primarily on the physical health of the woman.218 The 
Roe Court found that the State has an interest in ensuring the safety of all 
medical procedures, including abortions.219 Therefore, during the first 
trimester, the State could regulate abortions in the same ways that it 
could regulate other medical procedures, limiting this power to measures 
that “reasonably relate[] to the preservation and protection of maternal 
health.”220 
The Court further expanded the State interest in women’s health in 
Casey, in which the plurality recognized that the State had an interest not 
only in the physical health of the woman seeking an abortion, but also in 
her decisionmaking.221 The joint opinion stated that measures that serve 
to better inform the woman seeking an abortion about the procedure and 
options other than abortion are constitutional.222 Therefore, the plurality 
found that a waiting period requirement, while ostensibly burdensome 
for some women,223 was an appropriate means to ensure informed 
                                                     
213. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 182 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).  
214. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883, 850 (1992)). 
215. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
216. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 183 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571). 
217. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 327 (2006) (“[O]ur 
precedents hold . . . that a State may not restrict access to abortions that are ‘necessary . . . for the 
preservation of the life or health of the [woman].’”) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879). 
218. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). 
219. Id. at 150. 
220. Id. at 163. 
221. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877–78. 
222. Id.  
223. The Casey joint opinion dismissed findings by the District Court that the waiting period 
would be “particularly burdensome” on low-income women and those who had to travel long 
distances to receive an abortion. Id. at 885–87. The plurality found that “[a] particular burden is not 
of necessity a substantial obstacle.” Id. at 887. 
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consent.224 While the State could not create a “substantial obstacle” that 
would hinder the woman’s ability to make the ultimate decision, the 
State could still “persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion.”225 
The Court expanded the scope of the State interest in the mental 
health of the woman in Gonzales, in which the Court concluded that the 
banning of barbaric and cruel abortion procedures also aimed to protect 
the woman’s mental health.226 The Court reasoned that one effect of the 
ban on “partial-birth” abortions was to prevent the woman from 
experiencing profound anguish after undergoing the procedure: 
The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well 
informed. It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret 
her choice to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and 
sorrow more profound when she learns, only after the event, 
what she once did not know: that she allowed the doctor to 
pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her 
unborn child, a child assuming the human form.227 
While earlier abortion cases emphasized the State interest in protecting 
the fetus, the Court increasingly approved of measures that focused on 
the State interest in the physical and mental health of the woman.228 
V.  SEX- AND RACE-SELECTIVE ABORTION LAWS INFRINGE 
ON WOMEN’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
No legal challenge has yet been brought against a motive-based 
abortion restriction, and therefore no court has ruled on the 
constitutionality of these laws. If a court were to review a motive-based 
restriction, it should strike down the law as facially unconstitutional on 
two separate grounds. First, the law violates a woman’s liberty interest 
in her autonomous decisionmaking, which protects her personal motives 
and beliefs in seeking the procedure. Therefore, a law that targets her 
personal motives violates her constitutional rights. Second, a woman 
seeking an abortion on the basis of sex or race will be prohibited from 
obtaining the procedure prior to fetal viability, which violates Casey’s 
previability rule. Although motive-based restrictions do find limited 
precedential support in Gonzales, which upheld the prohibition of a 
                                                     
224. Id.  
225. Id. at 878. 
226. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007). 
227. Id.  
228. Id.  
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“gruesome and inhumane” abortion procedure,229 the motive-based 
restrictions are distinguishable from the Partial-Birth Abortion Act in 
several key respects. 
A.  The Right to an Abortion Encompasses the Subjective Motives and 
Intent of the Individual 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the decision to obtain 
an abortion is an intensely personal one.230 The liberty interest under the 
Due Process Clause protects not only the right to obtain an abortion, but 
also the reasons and motivations behind such a decision.231 Considering 
this dual nature of the liberty interest, laws that restrict access to 
abortion based on the personal motives of the individual woman infringe 
on the woman’s constitutional rights. 
The Court has recognized a woman’s liberty interest in reproductive 
autonomy to incorporate the woman’s personal beliefs. In Casey, the 
plurality characterizes the right to choose or forego contraception as a 
decision that reflects one’s personal views.232 Justice O’Connor’s 
description of the liberty interest in Casey as “the right to define one’s 
own concept of existence, of meaning . . . and of the mystery of human 
life”233 highlights the liberty interest’s dual nature: it creates affirmative 
rights regarding actions (the right to obtain an abortion) while 
simultaneously protecting the beliefs and thoughts of the individual (“the 
right to define one’s own concept of existence”234). 
While the Court now frames abortion rights primarily in terms of 
“liberty,”235 the discourse of privacy still remains an important principle 
in the Court’s jurisprudence.236 If the liberty right is understood to 
incorporate notions of privacy that protect people from “unwarranted 
governmental intrusion” in the realm of reproductive decisionmaking,237 
a law that monitors one’s beliefs and imposes the State’s values onto that 
decisionmaking violates that right. In this sense, the Oklahoma law that 
                                                     
229. Id. at 141 (quoting Partial-Birth Abortion Act, Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201, 1201 
(2003)). 
230. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 
U.S. 747, 772 (1986).  
231. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853. 
232. Id. at 851.  
233. Id.  
234. Id.  
235. See id. at 846 (“[T]he controlling word in the cases before us is ‘liberty.’”). 
236. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
237. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).  
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requires women seeking an abortion to complete a lengthy 
questionnaire238 violates women’s constitutional rights, as it allows the 
government to intrude upon the realm of private decisionmaking. 
The Court has also noted the diversity of views on abortion and the 
beginning of life, and concluded that women’s liberty interest must 
reflect this diversity of opinion. The purported State interest in reducing 
discriminatory abortions conflicts with this expansive conception of 
women’s liberty interest.239 In Casey, the Court stressed that the abortion 
debate touches on “intimate views with infinite variations,”240 and that 
“[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence . . . and of the mystery of human life.”241 The Casey plurality 
concluded that the State therefore does not have the power to compel 
people to adopt certain views.242 While “[m]en and women of good 
conscience can disagree” on abortion, the fact that some people “find 
abortion offensive” could not “control [the Court’s] decision.”243 The 
racist or sexist views of women covered by these motive-based abortion 
restrictions may be subject to mainstream society’s disapproval, but it 
does not follow that the State can then limit the reproductive liberty of 
these individuals. These views, while offensive to many, are still 
included as one “variation” of the “intimate views” referenced in Casey. 
The Court’s discussion of the liberty interest that protects intimate 
conduct also demonstrates how liberty encompasses both personal 
autonomy and autonomy of belief. In Lawrence v. Texas, a case where 
the Court struck down a ban against sodomy, Justice Kennedy wrote in 
his majority opinion: “Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that 
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate 
conduct.”244 Similarly, in Stanley v. Georgia,245 in which the Court 
recognized a right to possess pornography in the home, the Court 
declared: “Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of 
giving government the power to control men’s minds.”246 These cases 
                                                     
238. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.  
239. Casey, 503 U.S. at 853. 
240. Id.  
241. Id. at 851. 
242. See id. at 850 (answering in the negative as to the “underlying constitutional issue [of] 
whether the State can resolve these philosophic questions in such a definitive way that a woman 
lacks all choice in the matter”). 
243. Id. at 850.  
244. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
245. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
246. Id. at 565.  
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demonstrate that an individual’s thoughts and beliefs fall within the 
purview of his or her liberty rights. 
An opposing interpretation of liberty, one that grants the right to 
engage in a physical act but fails to protect the thoughts and beliefs that 
inform that act, results in an incomplete right. In this sense, the issue of 
motive-based restrictions highlights the ways in which ideas of 
autonomy and privacy intersect within the liberty right. Because the 
right is largely a right to autonomous decisionmaking, the right cannot 
exist without protecting, that is, keeping private and free from 
government regulation, the individual thoughts behind that 
decisionmaking. The premise that an individual’s subjective intent can 
be the basis for limiting the constitutional right fails to recognize the 
Court’s more expansive articulations of the liberty right. 
Admittedly, the Supreme Court has affirmed a certain degree of 
legislative encroachment on women’s mental autonomy in the context of 
abortion laws. For example, many of the regulations approved by the 
Court, such as informed consent requirements and waiting periods, seem 
directly tied to affecting or influencing the woman’s state of mind.247 In 
Casey, the Court recognized that the State has a right to “enact rules and 
regulations designed to encourage [the woman] to know that there are 
philosophical and social arguments of great weight that can be brought 
to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy.”248 The Court has shown 
itself to be increasingly receptive to measures that protect a woman’s 
mental health.249 For example, in Gonzales the Court upheld the abortion 
restriction in part because doing so may prevent the woman from feeling 
deep sadness and regret.250 
However, the motive-based abortion restrictions take this concept of 
influence a step further. As opposed to merely influencing a woman’s 
state of mind, these regulations deem certain abortions to be unlawful 
based on motive and intent. These laws do not aim to influence women’s 
thoughts and understandings of abortion but instead aim to prevent 
women with certain thoughts and views from accessing abortion 
procedures. Therefore, this type of regulation exceeds the State’s ability 
to persuade women in their decisionmaking. By attempting to regulate 
and restrict access to abortions based on a woman’s personal beliefs, 
motive-based restrictions infringe on the woman’s liberty interests. 
                                                     
247. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885–86.  
248. Id. at 872. 
249. See supra Part III.B.3. 
250. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007). 
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B.  The Motive-Based Restrictions Violate Women’s Constitutional 
Rights by Posing an Absolute Bar to Abortion Previability 
The effect of these motive-based restrictions is to create an absolute 
bar to receiving an abortion for women who are obtaining the procedure 
for specific reasons. While the Court has allowed certain regulations 
previability, the Court has also firmly held that a woman must still have 
access to abortion during that stage of pregnancy.251 The absolute 
prohibition before viability constitutes an undue burden and conflicts 
with the Court’s holdings in Casey and Gonzales. 
In Casey, the Court held that a woman has “the right . . . to choose to 
have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue 
interference from the State.”252 Before a fetus reaches viability, the State 
is substantially limited in the types of regulations it can enact.253 Even 
though the Court has upheld increasingly restrictive and invasive 
regulations,254 it has continued to maintain that the undue burden 
standard precludes the total prohibition on abortions previability.255 
Although the Court upheld the prohibition of all “partial-birth” abortions 
in Gonzales, this was not viewed as an undue burden as the Court 
concluded that the procedure was never medically necessary and that 
other constitutional procedures were available.256 
The federal bill, PRENDA, attempts to circumvent this issue by 
asserting that the majority of sex-selective abortions occur during the 
second and third trimester, stages in which the State does have the power 
to provide absolute bans on abortion as long as there is a health 
exception.257 However, the statutory text does not limit its prohibition to 
later trimesters.258 This begs the question of whether the State interest in 
combating gender and racial discrimination outweighs women’s 
constitutional right to first trimester autonomous decisionmaking. 
                                                     
251. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
252. Id. at 846. 
253. Id. at 870. 
254. Id. at 880–87 (upholding informed consent and twenty-four-hour waiting period 
requirements). 
255. Id. at 870.  
256. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 162–64 (2007); see Siegel, supra note 141, at 1770 
(“Justice Kennedy understands Casey to require protection for ordinary second-trimester abortions, 
and Carhart construes the Partial-Birth Abortion Act to protect these standard second-trimester 
procedures . . . .”). 
257. Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of 2011, H.R. 
3541, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(D) (2011). 
258. Id. § 3(a)(1). 
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Some have argued that the sex- and race-based discrimination that is 
the motivating force behind these abortions is serious enough to warrant 
legislative solutions.259 It is true that in many contexts, the federal 
government has an interest in prohibiting discrimination. Through its 
Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause powers, Congress has the 
ability to pass many forms of antidiscrimination legislation,260 which can 
regulate private action in areas such as employment,261 public 
accommodations,262 and housing.263 States have a similarly strong 
interest in combating discrimination, as evidenced by the fact that a 
majority of states have antidiscrimination statutes.264 Hate crime 
legislation demonstrates that racial animus and other forms of bias can 
be the basis for heightened criminal sanctions when accompanied with 
criminal acts.265 Some anti-abortion advocates have claimed that these 
abortions sought on the basis of the sex or race of the fetus are heinous 
enough to constitute hate crimes.266 
While the State interest in prohibiting discrimination is valid, the 
interest must be viewed through a different lens when a fundamental 
interest is implicated.267 For example, Congress can enact valid 
antidiscrimination legislation, but the need to protect religious freedom 
requires exemptions for religious employers.268 The same holds true for 
state laws: in United States v. Dale,269 the Court applied strict scrutiny to 
a state antidiscrimination law when it infringed on an organization’s 
First Amendment rights.270 The existence of a fundamental right does 
not necessarily render the State interest moot, as certain government 
                                                     
259. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 11. 
260. David B. Oppenheimer, The Supreme Court’s Conflict Over Antidiscrimination Law, 37 
HUM. RTS. 18, 18–19 (2010).  
261. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). 
262. Id. § 2000a.  
263. Id. § 3601. 
264. Jarod S. Gonzales, State Antidiscrimination Statutes and Implied Preemption of Common 
Law Torts: Valuing the Common Law, 59 S.C. L. REV. 115, 116–17 (2007).   
265. See 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012).  
266. E.g., Ultimate Hate Crime: Gender Selection Abortions, YOUTUBE, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X-PlpCeCyN8 (last visited June 5, 2012). 
267. Courts must apply strict scrutiny to legislation that infringes on a fundamental right. 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). 
268. See Julie Manning Magid & Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Religious and Associational 
Freedoms of Business Owners, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 191, 194–95 (2005).  
269. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
270. Id. at 644.  
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interests are compelling enough to justify the infringement.271 However, 
a law that directly infringes a woman’s constitutional right to decide 
whether to terminate a pregnancy is another matter. Considering that 
antidiscrimination laws generally target behavior that is not deemed 
fundamental for constitutional purposes,272 arguments in favor of 
motive-based restrictions that make analogies to these laws are 
fundamentally flawed. Because the Court has maintained that viability is 
still the proper standard to determine the extent to which States can 
prohibit abortions, rather than State interests in preventing 
discrimination, motive-based restrictions conflict with Casey’s holding. 
C.  The State Interests Recognized in Gonzales Are Distinguishable 
from Those Asserted in Motive-Based Abortion Restrictions 
One argument that could be made in defense of the constitutionality 
of motive-based abortion laws is that these laws prohibit conduct that is 
considered “barbaric” and “inhumane,” and therefore abortions that are 
motivated by certain prejudices are in the same vein as the prohibition 
on “partial-birth” abortion in Gonzales.273 In that case, the Court upheld 
a federal ban on intact D&E based partly on Congress’s finding that the 
procedure was “gruesome and inhumane.”274 The federal bill banning 
sex- and race-selective abortions contains findings that seem to echo the 
moral outrage in the Partial-Birth Abortion Act.275 For example, the 
Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act stated that sex-selection abortion is a 
“barbaric” practice of “sex-based or gender-based violence,” and often 
occurs in later stages of pregnancy when the fetus “has developed 
sufficiently to feel pain.”276 
Due to the fact that the moral justifications that were approved by the 
Court in Gonzales have few limiting principles—”gruesome” is a 
subjective standard, especially when it comes to medical procedures—a 
                                                     
271. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386–87. Professor Jaime Staples King of UC Hastings argues that the 
State interest in “societal integrity” may allow courts to regulate certain aspects of reproductive 
decisionmaking, such as access to reproductive technology. King, supra note 8, at 56.  
272. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (“There is no constitutional 
right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor 
union.”); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628–29 (1984); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 
176 (1976).  
273. See generally Suter, supra note 210, at 1587–92. 
274. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 141 (2007). 
275. Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of 2011, H.R. 
3541, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(D) (2011). 
276. Id.  
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State defending motive-based restrictions could argue that the laws are 
driven by similar moral concerns. It is also reasonable to assume that 
there are many who would find the practice of aborting fetuses solely on 
the basis of the sex or race of the fetus to be morally repugnant.277 In the 
House Judiciary Committee hearing for PRENDA, Representative 
Franks framed the issue in purely moral terms: 
I truly hope that the debate and passage of this bill will call all 
Americans . . . to an inward and heartfelt reflection upon the 
humanity of unborn children and the inhumanity of what is 
being done to them . . . . But, until then, can we not, at the very 
least, agree that it is wrong to knowingly kill unborn children 
because they are the wrong color or because they are baby girls 
instead of baby boys?278 
The moral opposition to discrimination on the basis of race or sex is only 
heightened when targeted at those who are deemed innocent and 
defenseless, and when the discrimination results in the end of potential 
life. 
The “gruesome and inhumane” standard provided in Gonzales fails to 
provide clear guidance on how to adjudicate future abortion laws that 
implicate similar State interests. However, a close reading of Gonzales 
provides certain guiding principles that should factor into the analysis of 
whether motive-based restrictions promote a lawful government 
purpose. While the motive-based restrictions may further the State 
interest in preventing the moral coarsening of society, other State 
interests recognized in Gonzales are markedly absent, making the 
motive-based laws distinguishable on several grounds. First, the motive-
based abortion laws do not target actions that are analogous to criminal 
acts. Second, the laws do not promote the mental and physical health of 
the woman. Third, the law at issue in Gonzales focused on abortion 
procedures, while motive-based laws restrict women’s liberty rights 
based on their personal beliefs. 
                                                     
277. Live Action, an anti-abortion non-profit organization that has produced “sting” videos 
involving Planned Parenthood, has advocated forcefully on the issue of sex-selective abortions. See 
Laura Bassett, Planned Parenthood Sting Caught on Video, Released by Anti-Abortion Activists, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 29, 2012, 11:16 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012 
/05/29/planned-parenthood-video_n_1552672.html; PROTECTOURGIRLS.COM: A PROJECT OF LIVE 
ACTION, http://protectourgirls.com (last visited Feb. 7, 2013). 
278. Hearing on H.R. 3451 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of Rep. Trent Franks). 
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1.  Motive-Based Restrictions Do Not Target Actions that Are 
Analogous to Criminal Acts 
The Gonzales Court concluded that the State can prohibit uniquely 
brutal or inhumane abortion procedures when the prohibited actions are 
analogous to criminal actions.279 The Court offered assisted suicide as 
another example of this line-drawing principle, reasoning that its 
similarity to euthanasia warranted government prohibition.280 If the 
similarity to criminal actions is an integral part of the Court’s reasoning, 
then Gonzales does not support motive-based restrictions. While 
discrimination on the basis of race and sex is unlawful in many 
contexts,281 it does not rise to the level of being criminally actionable on 
its own. If the court’s reasoning applies to any abortion procedure that is 
brutal or inhumane, then the application of Gonzales to motive-based 
restrictions is similarly problematic. The abortion of a fetus of a certain 
race or sex is not any more “brutal” or “inhumane” than any other 
abortion procedure, as both procedures extinguish fetal life through the 
same mechanisms. 
2.  Motive-Based Restrictions Do Not Protect Women’s Mental or 
Physical Health 
Motive-based restrictions cannot be justified based on concerns for 
the woman’s mental health. The Gonzales Court supported its decision 
by identifying the ban as a measure that will ultimately protect women’s 
mental health,282 and by recognizing that the State can impose measures 
that protect women from the perceived savagery of specific abortion 
methods.283 These arguments are predicated on an idea of the woman as 
a passive and uninformed patient, at risk of experiencing “[s]evere 
depression and loss of esteem” and “regret[ting] [her] choice to abort the 
infant life [she] once created and sustained.”284 
                                                     
279. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158.  
280. Id.  
281. See supra notes 260–264 and accompanying text. 
282. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159–60.  
283. Id. at 157.  
284. Id. at 159. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, conceded that there is no “reliable data 
to measure the phenomenon” of female post-abortion regret, but cited to an amicus brief detailing 
stories of this phenomenon. Id. Professor Reva Siegel points out that Kennedy failed to mention an 
opposing brief containing the testimonies of over 150 women who elected second-trimester 
abortions. Siegel, supra note 141, at 1732 n.110. Many scholars have critiqued the Court’s 
reasoning in this area and claimed that these measures are not in fact protective of women’s well 
being. Suter, supra note 210, at 1579 (“Clearly, a statute cannot promote informed consent by 
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The hypothetical woman targeted by these laws, one who is 
prohibited from obtaining an abortion due to her sexist or racist views, 
stands in stark contrast to the emotionally fragile woman imagined by 
the Gonzales Court. The hypothetical sexist or racist abortion-seeker 
does not suffer from a lack of information, but rather has too much of it, 
as she knows certain information about her fetus that is motivating her to 
obtain an abortion. The nature of the motive-based restriction implies a 
degree of knowledge and intentionality on the part of the woman—she is 
choosing an abortion because she consciously does not want a specific 
child. While this woman may come to “regret her choice,” she is not 
necessarily more susceptible to this regret than a woman who chooses 
the procedure for reasons relating to her income, career, health, or family 
size. 
The State may have a sufficient interest in preventing these types of 
abortions that it can pass legislation that requires women to learn about 
the alleged harmfulness of or moral opposition to these discriminatory 
actions. Many states have passed “informed consent” laws that require 
doctors to impart certain information to a woman before performing an 
abortion, including detailed descriptions of the fetus285 and information 
about potential side effects of the procedure.286 One can imagine that a 
State could pass a law that requires the woman to hear about sex and 
race equality, or the State interest in preventing a gender gap in the 
population, and a court would analyze these types of laws under Casey’s 
undue burden test. Preventing a woman from obtaining an abortion 
based on her personal beliefs, however, does not flow from the State’s 
informative powers. 
                                                     
eliminating any possibility of consent.”); Ronald Dworkin, The Court & Abortion: Worse Than You 
Think, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 31, 2007, at 21 (noting that if the goal is to prevent a woman’s 
“possible ‘severe depression and loss of self esteem,’ . . . by not permitting her to choose how her 
fetus will be killed, why may it not protect her more securely by not permitting her an abortion at 
all?”). 
285. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.725 (West 2006) (“The materials shall include . . . a 
pictorial or photographic depiction of the zygote, blastocyte, embryo, or fetus.”); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 333.17015 (West 2001) (requiring a “medically accurate depiction, illustration, or 
photograph and description” of the fetus); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.016 (West 
2012) (“The informational materials must . . . inform the woman of the probable anatomical and 
physiological characteristics of the unborn child at two-week gestational increments”); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-7-305.5 (West 2008). 
286. E.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (requiring doctors to inform women of 
the possibility of hemorrhaging and increased risk of breast cancer due to an abortion). 
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3.  Motive-Based Restrictions Directly Target Women’s Liberty, While 
Gonzales Dealt with Medical Procedures 
Another major difference between the Partial-Birth Abortion Act and 
motive-based abortion restrictions is that the former targets abortion 
procedures, while the latter targets the purpose behind the woman’s 
decision. Because the law at issue in Gonzales focused on one abortion 
procedure, the Court concluded that the law did not hinder women’s 
ability to exercise their reproductive rights. The Gonzales majority held 
that Congress had the authority to conclude that the procedure is never 
medically necessary.287 A corollary of this reasoning is that a woman 
who seeks an abortion, as long as she is seeking the abortion prior to 
viability, still has access to an abortion.288 All that is restricted is her 
access to one specific type of procedure. 
The “gruesome” aspect of intact D&E derives from the physical 
components of the procedure,289 not from the purpose or motivation 
behind the procedure. This is a useful distinction, as the motivation, of 
either the woman or the doctor, behind an intact D&E is the same for all 
other abortions: the termination of the pregnancy. Gonzales does not 
address whether the purpose behind obtaining an abortion can be 
“inhumane” enough to warrant restriction. 
Due to these important differences, a court should not uphold a 
motive-based restriction based on Gonzales. The precedential weight of 
the Court’s decision in Gonzales, as it pertains to legislation prohibiting 
other abortion procedures deemed gruesome or immoral, is still 
unclear.290 However, motive-based restrictions do not share several of 
the primary characteristics of the partial-birth abortion procedure that 
supported the Court’s reasoning. 
                                                     
287. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 163–64.  
288. Id. at 164 (“Alternatives are available to the prohibited procedure.”). 
289. Id. at 141 (quoting Partial-Birth Abortion Act, Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201, 1201 
(2003)).  
290. This does not mean that courts have not considered Gonzales in other contexts. In Isaacson 
v. Horne, 884 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz. 2012), a United States District Court interpreted Gonzales 
as allowing states to prohibit previability abortions generally. See id. at 967–68. Based on this 
interpretation of the case, the court upheld Arizona’s law banning abortions after twenty weeks 
because there was a health exception and abortions before twenty weeks were still available. Id. at 
967–71. The trial court’s decision is currently on appeal before the Ninth Circuit. Julia Zebley, 
Ninth Circuit Hears Arguments on Arizona 20-Week Abortion Ban, JURIST (Nov. 6, 2012, 8:13 
AM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2012/11/ninth-circuit-hears-arguments-on-arizona-20-week-
abortion-ban.php. 
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CONCLUSION 
Only six states currently have laws that restrict women’s access to 
abortion based on their personal motivations, but based on recent state 
legislative patterns, this number may grow in the future. The fact that 
advances in reproductive technologies will provide greater opportunities 
to learn more information about the genetic characteristics of the fetus 
means that support for these measures may also increase. While many 
people may have strong moral opposition to sex- and race-selective 
abortions, these motive-based restrictions conflict with many of the 
central principles of the Court’s reproductive liberty jurisprudence. 
Numerous cases demonstrate that the liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause encompasses the personal beliefs and values that inform 
one’s reproductive decisionmaking. Also, the State cannot pass measures 
that unduly restrict women from obtaining abortions during the first 
trimester. Lastly, while Gonzales may support other abortion restrictions 
based on moral grounds, many of the justifications supporting 
Congress’s ban on partial-birth abortions do not apply to motive-based 
abortions, thereby minimizing the applicability of Gonzales as 
precedent. While motive-based restrictions target practices that many 
people find morally offensive, these laws infringe women’s 
constitutional rights. Therefore, a court that reviews a motive-based 
abortion restriction in the future should hold the law to be 
unconstitutional. 
 
